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Abstract
Is social capital a substitute or a complement to formal institutions
for achieving economic growth? A number of recent micro studies suggest
that interpersonal trust has its greatest impact on economic performance
when court institutions are relatively weak. The conventional wisdom
from most macro studies, however, is that social capital is unconditionally
good for growth. On the basis of the micro evidence, we outline an invest-
ment game between a producer and a lender in an incomplete-contracts
setting. A key insight is that social capital will have the greatest e¤ect on
the total surplus from the game at lower levels of institutional strength and
that the e¤ect of social capital vanishes when institutions are very strong.
When we bring this prediction to an empirical cross-country growth re-
gression, it is shown that the marginal e¤ect of social capital (in the form
of interpersonal trust) decreases with institutional strength. Our results
imply that a one standard deviation rise in social capital in weakly insti-
tutionalized Nigeria should increase economic growth by 1.8 percentage
points, whereas the same increase in social capital only increases growth
by 0.3 percentage points in strongly institutionalized Canada.
1 Introduction
Research on the impacts of social capital and formal institutions on economic
development have so far mainly emerged as two distinct elds. In the former
literature, trust, networks, social norms, and associational activity are believed
to be central aspects of successful economies. In the institutional literature, for-
mal rules of the game such as property rights laws and the strength of courts are
regarded as critical for development. We argue that there is an important dis-
connection between results from micro studies of social capital - which indicate
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that various self enforcement mechanisms are more prevalent when contracting
institutions are weak - and macro studies where social capital-related measures
are hypothesized to have a uniform positive impact on economic performance.
In this article, we outline a unied theoretical framework of the relative
importance of social capital and formal institutions in a simple principal-agent
investment model featuring a producer and a lender in an incomplete contract-
setting. The probability of contract enforcement by an exogenous court is our
major indicator of institutional strength and social capital enters our model
as an extra socialor intrinsicpayo¤ to both players from acting trusting or
trustworthy. The major insight from our model is that social capital tends to
have its greatest positive impact on the total monetary surplus from the game
(economic growth) at lower levels of institutional development and that the
positive impact eventually vanishes if institutions become strong enough.
This basic prediction about substitution is then brought to the macro level
and tested in a cross-country growth regression. In accordance with our hypoth-
esis, our results show that the marginal impact of our proxy for social capital
(interpersonal trust) decreases with the quality of formal institutions. More pre-
cisely, our results imply that a one standard deviation increase in social capital
leads to a 1.10 percentage points increase in the growth rate among countries at
the 25th percentile of institutional strength, whereas the e¤ect among countries
at the 75th percentile of institutional strength is only 0.36 percentage points.
Our results are robust to using an instrumental variables-methodology where
we take into account that social capital and institutions might be endogenous
to growth or indeed have a causal impact on each other.
Our approach combines two major types of building blocks: (1) The litera-
ture on the macroeconomic e¤ects of formal institutions and (2) the extensive
empirical literature on the micro and macro e¤ects of social capital. Starting
with institutional economics, this tradition emphasizes how formal institutions
such as those regulating the strength of property rights, the constraints against
the executive, and the power of courts are fundamental determinants of long-run
growth. Following in the footsteps of Douglass North (1981, 1990), a number of
seminal contributions have emerged over the recent decade such as Knack and
Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al (2001, 2002), Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005), and Banerjee and Iyer (2005). These studies all show that
good formal institutions are strongly associated with prosperity, although joint
endogeneity problems are still an important econometric issue in the literature.
Unlike our study, this literature also aims at explaining why some countries
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have better formal institutions than others. None of these studies, however,
attempt to quantify the e¤ect of informal institutions such as social networks or
interpersonal trust. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) di¤erentiate between court
(contracting) and property rights institutions, but do not study the impact of
private enforcement mechanisms.
Social capital is arguably one of the most elusive concepts in social science.
As discussed by Bjornskov (2006), there are at least three important dimensions
of social capital: Generalized trust, social norms, and associational/network ac-
tivity. In this paper, we will focus on social capital as generalized trust among
people, i.e. an optimistic expectation about the behavior of fellow citizens,
many of whom we do not know personally. The empirical cross-country macro
literature on social trust includes seminal contributions by Knack and Keefer
(1997) and Zak and Knack (2001).1 The paper most closely related to ours
is Zak and Knack (2001) who regress economic growth on both levels of in-
terpersonal trust (from World Value Surveys, WVS) and on an index of formal
institutional strength in a cross-section of 41 countries, most of which are indus-
trialized. The authors nd that interpersonal trust is positively and signicantly
related to growth when holding formal institutions constant. However, they do
not explore the possibility of non-linear e¤ects of trust that depend on di¤erent
levels of formal institutions. In a robustness analysis of Zak and Knack (2001),
Beugelsdijk et al (2004) nd that the results are in general fairly robust, even
when including some institutions-related measures (such as religion and political
instability), but that the marginal impact of trust is greater in low-trust coun-
tries. Similarly, Tabellini (2006) nds a positive e¤ect of interpersonal trust on
growth in European regions using an instrumental variable approach, but does
not analyze any di¤erential e¤ects depending on formal institutions2 .
The overall picture in the micro studies is mixed but nevertheless suggests
that social capital has a larger e¤ect on economic performance when formal
institutions are weak. Table 1 shows a summary of some of the more well-
known studies.3 For instance, Bigsten et al (2000) and Fafchamps and Minten
1See Durlauf (2002) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) for a critical discussion of this line
of research.
2Tabellini uses data from 69 regions in 8 Western European countries and includes country
xed e¤ects. The instruments used are literacy rate around 1880 and constraints on the
executive in the years 1600-1850. However, he does not include any measures of formal
institutions at the regional level. Studying data from 54 European regions, Beugelsdijk and
van Schaik (2005) nd that associational activity is the best predictor or growth.
3The results referred to in the table should not be thought of as having a perfect corre-
spondence with each other or with our model since the mentioned studies all use di¤erent
methodologies. We believe they still well illustrate our basic point.
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(2002) both conrm that social capital has a strong role when property rights
and courts are working imperfectly. The main hypothesis that emerges from
these micro studies is therefore that social trust and formal institutions should
be primarily substitutes in the growth process at the macro level.
Our paper is not the rst e¤ort that tries to understand how micro results
on trust can be translated to a macro level. Beugelsdijk (2006) argues that
it is conceptually di¢ cult to move from micro results to a macro level when
it comes to social capital and that generalized trust as measured by the WVS
might actually capture the quality of formal institutions, a claim that Uslaner
(2008) strongly refutes. In a similar vein, Bjornskovs (2006) empirical analysis
suggests that social trust has a positive impact on the quality of government,
whereas Rothstein (2000) argues that it is rather good government that causes
general trust. Our analysis departs from these studies by treating social trust
and institutions as two distinct factors and by estimating whether they are
substitutes in development, as our model predicts. Furthermore, our use of
instrumental variables arguably neutralizes the concerns referred to above about
the possible linkages between generalized trust and formal institutions.
In summary, we argue that our article o¤ers two specic contributions to the
literature. Firstly, our simple modelling framework rationalizes the empirical
regularity from the micro level that social capital a¤ects growth and investment
mainly when institutions are relatively weak. Secondly, our article is the rst one
to demonstrate empirically (and with the use of IV-methods) that generalized
trust and institutional quality are substitutes for growth.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and
derive the key results for the relevance of social capital and institutions. In
section 3 we display the empirical specications and present the results. Section
4 concludes the exposition.
2 The Model
In order to provide an aid for thinking about the e¤ects of institutions and social
capital on growth, we present in this section a simple model of an investment
game between a Lender and a Producer, inspired by the empirical literature
referred to above. The purpose of the model is to provide a micro-foundation
for our hypotheses regarding the interrelationships between social capital and
institutions at the macro level.
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The model is a sequential, principal-agent investment game with a repre-
sentative Lender and Producer and a Court as described in extensive form in
Figure 1.4 We have chosen to analyze an investment problem since it is standard
to regard investment as a key engine of economic growth, but similar types of
situations also apply in supplier-producer and buyer-seller situations with trade
credit. We also believe that this type of game is quite similar to the scenarios
described in the empirical literature referred to above. The game is one of per-
fect information and players are assumed to be risk neutral and non-cooperative.
There are no other agents in the economy.
In the initial Credit Stage, Lender chooses whether to lend the required
amount of capital k or not. If she chooses not to, the game ends, no production
occurs, and payo¤s are uL = uP = 0 for Lender and Producer respectively.
This is the autarkicor status quo situation where agents remain in subsistence
production.
<Figure 1 about here>
In the second Contract Stage, the players have entered a market economy
where a lending of k units of capital has occurred and production has been
undertaken. Producer considers the option of fullling the credit contract which
would result in Producer receiving a net monetary payo¤ of P > 0 plus a
non-monetary social benet of cooperation sP > 0, discussed further below.
Likewise, Lender would in this case be repaid the credit amount k and in addition
get a monetary compensation L > 0 and a social payo¤ from being trusting
sL > 0. This is also the socially optimal situation in the sense that it maximizes
aggregate welfare and total monetary payo¤s.
The si-terms capture rewards stemming from the trust and trustworthiness
among our representative agents. The players may or may not have a previous
history of interactions and the trust they show should be regarded as generalized
trust and not network-specic. These extra payo¤s are a kind of social reward
such as a strengthened reputation or the moral satisfaction from living up to
the positive expectation of cooperation.5 The payo¤s only materialize if the
player in question has shown a trusting and cooperative behavior in the rst
and second states. If Producer reneges in the second stage, he forgoes this social
4A similar but more complex model of "trust in the shadow of the court" is provided by
Brennan et al (2003).
5See for instance Brennan et al (2003), Guth and Ockenfels (2005) and Francois and Zabo-
jnik (2005) for similar intrinsic rewardsfrom cooperation.
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payo¤ whereas Lender retains it throughout the game if she has provided the
credit in the rst stage and thereby proved to be a trusting person. We further
assume that social payo¤s are fully observable by both players.
The conventional payo¤s from the investment P and L have been agreed
upon in the contract. L could take the form of an interest payment to Lender
or indeed as prot-sharing of some form. We leave it open here what type of
nancing arrangement the two players have agreed upon, although we could
have easily made such a choice endogenous.
The other option for Producer is to renege on the contract, by which is
meant that he retains the compensation to Lender L that was stipulated by
the contract and repudiates Lenders claims to a repayment of k. The dispute
may then end up in court in the third stage. This is the Lawsuit Stage, where the
Lender decides whether to take the reneging Producer to court or not. Should
the Lender choose not to go to court the Producer keeps the total monetary
payo¤ from the project L + P while we assume that he cannot benet from
the credit k that he has failed to repay.6 The Lender is left with a social payo¤
sL and with a loss of his credit.7 If Lender chooses to go to court, the court will
enforce the contract with a probability , which is our indicator of the strength
of contracting institutions.  is simply meant to reect how strong courts are
and is not intended to imply any form of strategic interaction between the Court
and the Producer. The cost of going to court is covered by a loser-pays-principle,
according to which the losing party pays a ne of d to the court. If the contract
is properly enforced, Lender gets her credit in return and receives a net payo¤
of L + sL while Producer receives P   d.
If the contract is not enforced by the court, Producer ends up with L +
P . Lender receives no compensation and no repayment of the credit and thus
receives a net utility of  k   d + sL from lending. Obviously, many Lenders
would require some form of collateral for the loan, but for simplicity we abstract
from that in this simple setting. We also leave out aspects like the degree of
contract complexity or additional social costs of a negative court ruling.
Using the payo¤ structure above, we can easily derive the following set of
solutions:
6We make this assumption so that a failure to act trustworthy is also associated with a kind
of waste in terms of total monetary payo¤s. This is not a critical assumption but simplies
derivations.
7Another possibility, often observed in reality, is that Lender o¤ers a renegotiation at this
point, o¤ering Producer not to be socially disgraced, perhaps in return for the credit and a
smaller part of the net surplus from the investment.
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Solutions: The best response strategies of the players and the SPNE of the
game are determined by the following conditions:
Credit stage
(Lender)
:
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Lend if any of the following conditions applies:
(i) L  sL +  (L + k + d)  k   d  0
(ii) sL   k  0
(iii) Producer will fulll
Not lend if none of (i), (ii), or (iii) applies.
Contract stage
(Producer)
:
(
Fulll if F  sP +  (L + d)  L  0
Renege otherwise
Lawsuit stage
(Lender)
:
8><>:
Not to Court if sL   k  0 and
 ((L + k + d))  d  0
To Court otherwise.
The key expressions above are L = L(sL; ; L; k; d) and F = F (sP ; ; L; d)
which determine whether the socially optimal equilibrium (Lend, Fulll) is ob-
tained or not. Lenders willingness to lend and Producers willingness to fulll
will increase with the social payo¤s from trustworthy behavior sL and sP and
from the strength of court institutions . Social capital and institutions are
substitutes in the sense that either increases in sL and sP or an increase in 
could make L or F positive. The size of the investment, given by k; a¤ects
Lender in the sense that she becomes more cautious and less willing to lend
as k increases. The Lenders willingness to lend will be positively associated
with her investment returns L, whereas these will have a negative inuence on
Producers willingness to fulll since a higher level makes it more tempting to
try to appropriate this payo¤.
Disregarding all other variables for a moment and assuming that sL = sP =
s < k, we can write L(s; ) and F (s; ). Let us imagine a situation where court
institutions are at a low level low such that L(s; low) < 0 and F (s; low) < 0,
which means that monetary payo¤s are (0; 0). There is then a s > 0 such that
either L(s + s; low) = 0 or F (s + s; low) = 0; which means that Lender
supplies the credit and production occurs. In other words, at low levels of ,
an increase in social capital s can lead to economic development. However, at a
high level of court strength high such that L(s; high)  0 and F (s; high)  0,
the socially optimal equilibrium is already obtained and an equivalent increase
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s will have no e¤ect. Hence, social capital increases will have a stronger
positive e¤ect when institutions are weak.
As was mentioned in the introduction, we do not attempt to explain how
court institutions and social capital have emerged in the rst place, but we
recognize that they could both be driven by the same underlying set of forces
(history, geography, ethnic fractionalization, etc) and are likely to be positively
correlated.8 Let us think of s as being proportional to the average level of social
capital in society, i.e. the total stock of interpersonal trust that has accumulated
over the years. We assume that the higher the average level, the greater the
payo¤ from acting trustworthy. Equivalently, if the average level of trust is
small, people will not be expected to cooperate and the social opportunity cost
of reneging (s) should be relatively small.
As a further illustration of the model, we provide a numerical example in
Figure 2 where we assume L = P = 3; k = 2, d = 1, sL = sP = s. The ex-
ample assumes a relatively small investment with a relatively high total payo¤
and a payo¤/investment ratio of (L + P ) =k = 6=2 = 3. The simplication
allows us to analyze the relationship between the two remaining variables in
the system; the strength of court institutions  and the social payo¤ s. The
potential outcomes of this game follow from Solutions above. The A-area
shows the input requirement setof court strength and social capital for the
(Lend; Fulfill)-equilibrium to apply. The line dened by  = 3 s4 shows the
combinations of  and s where Producer is indi¤erent about reneging or ful-
lling. The curve is negatively sloped and linear, indicating that in this setup
social capital and formal institutions are perfect substitutes. The equivalent
line for Lender is given by  = 3 s6 in the s 2 [0; 2)-interval. In the B-area are
the combinations where the players end up in court. The area dened by   16
and s  2 makes up the C-area where Producer reneges but Lender will not go
to court. Since  and s in reality tend to be correlated, it is rather unlikely that
an economy could end up here. The D-area, lastly, hosts combinations where
 < 3 s6 and s < 2, which yields the outcome with no investment (0; 0).
<Figure 2 about here>
The main point of the gure is to illustrate intuitively how the e¤ect of
an exogenous increase in social capital can depend on the level of institutional
8See for instance Congdon Fors and Olsson (2007) for a model of endogenous institutional
change and Bjornskov (2006) for an empirical analysis of how social trust appears to cause
good governance.
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strength. The four arrows in the A, B, and D-areas show equally large increases
in social capital.9 In the A-area, an increase in s has no e¤ect since the players
are already in the good equilibrium. This might be thought of as equivalent to
a rst-best outcome which would always be in place if institutions were perfect.
Two arrows originate in the D-area. The lower placed arrow shows that higher
social capital may not be enough to push the economy into a better equilibrium.
As mentioned above, we do not think that this scenario with a very low  and
a relatively high s is often observed in reality.10 The upper arrow originating in
the D-area shows that beginning at a higher level of court strength can make
all the di¤erence. In the B-area, nally - where Lender supplies the credit,
Producer reneges, and the contract is settled in court - an increase in social
capital is very likely to lead to the good equilibrium.
In summary, the simple framework employed here gives at least three in-
sights. First, our model has the feature that formal institutions and social
capital can be substitutes in the pursuit of the growth-maximizing equilibrium.
Second, the model shows that at high levels of institutional strength, social
capital can be irrelevant for the growth outcome. Thirdly, at low and inter-
mediate levels of institutional strength, increases in social capital might have
a positive e¤ect on the total payo¤ from investment. The model thus implies
that the impact of an increase in social capital should decrease with the level of
institutional strength.
3 Empirical Evidence
Our model and overview of the micro literature indicate that the e¤ect of social
capital on economic performance is nonlinear and will depend on the quality
of institutions. Likewise, the e¤ect of institutions on economic performance
will di¤er between low-trust countries and high-trust countries. To keep our
investigation comparable to the focal papers in the literature on social capital
and growth, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001), we employ a
standard cross-country Barro-style growth model. Besides comparability with
previous research this has two additional advantages - we can use what may
be the best proxy available for social capital, interpersonal trust from World
9We recognize that the e¤ect of exogenous increases in institutional strength also will
depend on the level of social capital.
10Such a scenario might perhaps be observed in countries where the state has more or less
collapsed and where social bonding has taken its place, as in Somalia in the 1990s. Such
countries will, however, not be included in our empirical analysis.
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Values Surveys (WVS), and yet have su¢ cient variation in institutional quality.
The growth regression technique has well-known drawbacks (see e.g. Brock
and Durlauf, 2001 and Durlauf, 2002) but it can reveal interesting patterns of
correlation and the results are straightforward to interpret. To the standard
package of regressors, initial income, investment, and human capital, we add
social capital and institutions.
3.1 Model and data
The econometric models we employ will be variations on(
(i) growthi;1995 2005
(ii) investment ratei;2000
)
= 0+1initial incomei+2investment pricesi+3human capitali
+4social capitali+5institutionsi+6social capitaliinstitutionsi
+errori:
Our predictions are that 4; 5 > 0 but 6 < 0. Where possible we will use
initial values as regressors to mitigate concerns of reversed causality.11 In our
main regressions we use growth in real per capita GDP and life expectancy from
the World Bank (2006a) and initial income and investment prices from Heston
et al (2006).12 Interpersonal trust is coded from WVS data as the weighted
share of respondents answering that most people can be trustedwhen asked
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you cant be too careful in dealing with people?.
Interpersonal trust as it appear in WVS is an imperfect measure for social
capital, as discussed by for instance Beugelsdijk (2006). In our model we pick
one aspect whereby social capital can a¤ect economic performance that indi-
viduals gain a positive utility from being trusting and acting honestly. When
more people are honst and trusting, we will see a larger fraction of the respon-
11All specications are estimated with OLS unless we explicitly state otherwise.
12By using life expectancy instead of average years of schooling like Knack and Keefer
(1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) we are able to include six more countries in our sample
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Malta, Nigeria, Romania and Russia). Temple (1999) argues,
following Nuxoll (1994), that it is preferable to use national accounts data, such as the data
from the World Bank, to generate growth rates and data from the Penn World Tables, i.e.
Heston et al (2006), for levels. In short, the reason is that Heston et al use international prices
while national account data is based on domestic prices, and hence the latter better reect
the e¤ect on domestic agents. Our qualitative results are not a¤ected by this use of di¤erent
sources for GDP per capita.
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dents answering that most people can be trusted, giving the country a higher
score on interpersonal trust.13
In our main specications we use Quality of Government in 1995 from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as the measure of institutional qual-
ity. Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics for the key variables used in
our main specications are presented in tables 2 and 3. Quality of Government
is the average of ICRGs measures of corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy
quality, all of which are arguably related to the risk and cost involved in trying
to enforce a contract. Ideally, we would use a direct measure for quality of
contracting institutions since this would take us even closer to our theoretical
investment game, but to our knowledge no such measure is available for a large
enough sample for 1995 or earlier. The World Banks (2006b) measures for the
number of procedures involved in, as well as the number of days required for, and
the cost of enforcing a contract, comes very close to the concept of contracting
institutions but using them creates severe problems of reverse causality. That
said, in table 8 we show that our ndings are robust to using these measures
instead of Quality of Government.
3.2 Results
The central results from the growth regressions are presented in table 4. In
equation (4.5) interpersonal trust and institutions enter positively and their
interaction enters as negative and all three regressors are estimated with high
precision. Comparing specication (4.5) with specication (4.4) and (4.2) we see
that the introduction of the interaction term increases the estimated coe¢ cients
of interpersonal trust, and a straightforward interpretation is that the growth-
enhancing e¤ect of more interpersonal trust when institutions are at a low level
is underestimated in (4.2) and (4.4).14 The signicant interaction term means
13Zak and Knack (2001) use values on interpersonal trust from as late as 1995 to explain
growth between 1970 and 1992, and this raises concerns of reversed causality. Nevertheless,
due to sample size considerations we are also forced to include some countries where data
on interpersonal trust was not available untill in 1996 or 1997. When available we use inter-
personal trust measured between 1990 and 1995. Then we include countries where trust was
measured in 1996, 1997, and between 1981-89, which gives us 8 additional countries (Bulgaria,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela).
14 Institutional quality and trust are correlated (a bivariate correlation of 0.72) and tests
show that we have multicollinearity in the model. Institutional quality is even more correlated
with initial income and life expectancy (0.82 and 0.89 respectively), illustrating that if we
cannot simply drop variables due to high correlation. Considering that the results are fairly
robust to the changes in variables and sample size we have tried high correlation should not
cause too much concern.
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that the marginal e¤ect of interpersonal trust will be di¤erent at di¤erent levels
of institutional quality. The average growth rate in per capita GDP between
1995 and 2005 in the sample of countries included in the growth regression is
2.42 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.44 percentage points. At the 25th
percentile of institutional quality the marginal e¤ect of a one standard deviation
increase in interpersonal trust is 1.10 percentage points higher annual growth in
GDP/capita, while it is 0.68 percentage points higher at median institutional
quality and 0.36 percentage points at the 75th percentile.15
The other side of the coin is that the marginal e¤ect of an improvement
in institutional quality also will depend on the level of interpersonal trust. A
one standard deviation increases in institutional quality at the 25th percentile
of interpersonal trust implies 1.17 percentage points higher annual growth in
per capita GDP, while the corresponding gures at the median and at the 75th
percentile of interpersonal trust are 0.91 and 0.53 percentage points respectively.
Clearly, countries with low institutional quality have the most to gain from
better social capital and countries with low levels of social capital has the most
to gain from improvements in institutional quality.
To investigate the e¤ects on investment directly the same regressors as in the
growth regression are used but the investment rate from World Bank (2006a)
is used as regressand.16 The result from this exercise is presented in table 5
where neither interpersonal trust nor institutions enter signicantly when they
are included by themselves or together. When we include both of them as well
as their interaction in specication (5.5) they get the expected signs and the
estimates are statistically signicant. The positive e¤ect of social capital on
the investment rate is higher at lower levels of institutions, and the positive
e¤ect of institutions is higher at lower levels of social capital. The average
investment rate in 2000 for the countries included in regression (5.5) is 22.31
percent of GDP, with a standard deviation of 3.93 percentage points. At the 25th
percentile of institutional quality the marginal e¤ect of a one standard deviation
increase in interpersonal trust is 2.67 percentage points higher investment rate,
while it is 0.63 percentage points higher at median institutional quality and
0.98 percentage points lower (sic) at the 75th percentile. Though it is clear that
15Zak and Knack (2001) estimated that a standard deviation increase in social capital
would increase annual growth by "nearly" 1 percentage point. Thus, while their estimate
does not take the di¤erential e¤ects stemming from di¤erences in formal institutional quality
into account, it is on the same order of magnitude as ours.
16The investment rate correctly termed the gross capital formation in percent of GDP which
consists of outlays on xed assets and inventory investments.
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the e¤ect will not be the same for all countries this negative gure for some
countries is most likely the result of the way we structure the nonlinearity of
social capital and institutions.
A one standard deviation increase in institutional quality at the 25th per-
centile of interpersonal trust implies 3.16 percentage points higher investment
rate, while the corresponding gures at the median and at the 75th percentile
of interpersonal trust are 2.24 and 0.81 percentage points respectively. That the
estimated e¤ect on the investment rate seems too moderate to fully explain the
e¤ect on the growth rate is in perfect order. First, to assume that institutions
and social capital a¤ect growth only via more investments would be a gross
oversimplication, and hence not something we would advocate. Second, the
measure for investment rate is a measure of the quantity of investments rather
than the potentially more important aspect of the quality of investments. It is
a fairly safe assumption that we will see positive e¤ects on growth from a higher
quality of investment, such as a smaller fraction being directed to activities that
are not primarily prot generating (monitoring, insurance, security, etc.).
3.3 Robustness
It is likely that both interpersonal trust and institutions are measured with
error and may be correlated with possible omitted variables that end up in the
error term. A potentially important issue that would cause the OLS estimates
to be biased is that interpersonal trust, as measured by the WVS, could partly
capture the quality of formal institutions, as argued by Beugelsdijk (2006).
Alternatively, the OLS estimates could also be biased if interpersonal trust has a
positive impact on institutional quality, as argued by Bjornskov (2006). To deal
with these potential problems and at the same time allow for a larger sample,
which requires including post-1997 values of interpersonal trust, we estimate
specication (4.5) using Two-Stage Least Squares, 2SLS, in specications (6.2)
and (6.3) of table 6. The instruments used in (6.2) and (6.3) are British and
Socialist legal origin, the distance from the equator, and the mean distance
from the ocean or a navigable river (see table 2 for more information). Legal
origin and distance from the equator are commonly used as instruments for
institutional quality (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Hall and Jones 1999). To our
knowledge, we are the rst to use mean distance from the ocean or a navigable
river as instrument for institutions or interpersonal trust.
The instruments need to be valid, i.e. only a¤ect the dependent variable
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indirectly through their e¤ect on the endogenous variables. In all our regressions
the results of the appropriate tests for the overidentifying restrictions are always
that the instruments are valid, see the notes in table 6 for test statistics used and
exact results. Instruments also need to be su¢ ciently informative. Following the
critical values in Stock and Yogo (2002) our instruments are not weak. They are
not particularly strong either, wherefore we use Limited Information Maximum
Likelihood (LIML) estimation, which is a more reliable estimation technique
when the instruments are weak.17 Testing also rejects the exogeneity of the
instrumented variables, implying that the OLS estimates will be inconsistent
and that instrumental variables methods should be used.
We have the same concerns for the investment rate regressions as for the
growth regressions so we reestimate specication (5.5) with IV methods in spec-
ications (6.5) and (6.6). The magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cients increase
when we use IV methods, implying that the OLS estimates su¤ered from mea-
surement error-driven attenuation bias, while a Hausman test of the instru-
mented variables shows that they are exogenous, implying that OLS is consis-
tent. We present the 2SLS and LIML results for completeness.
Over time, the level of interpersonal trust is inuenced by the quality of
formal institutions and vice versa. Given the relative stability of interpersonal
trust and quality of formal institutions, this is not likely to be a substantial
econometrical problem for growth regressions over periods as short as the one
we have. But, if we would estimate the e¤ect of interpersonal trust on growth
over longer periods of time we should also take into account the indirect e¤ect it
has through its e¤ect on formal institutions.18 Since the instrumented variables
are cleansed from variation stemming from these kinds of inuences, also this
potential problem is dealt with when we instrument for interpersonal trust and
formal institutions.
In tables 7 and 8, we use di¤erent measures for our basic variables interper-
17Stock and Yogo (2002) nds that LIML is far superiorto 2SLS in the presence of weak
instruments. When the included instruments are weak LIML estimates are median unbiased
but 2SLS is not, and LIML also have more reliable condence intervals. The rule of thumb
used to indicate weak instrument is that of a rst stage F-value smaller than 10 (Staiger and
Stock, 1997), but this rule should only be used when there is no more than one endogenous
variable. Stock and Yogo (2002) provides critical values for more cases. In their terminology
we have n=3 (three endogenous variables) and K=4 ( four instruments). In their Table 1
values for n=3 and K<5 are not listed, but the critical F-value for the 2SLS bias for n=3 and
K=5 is 6.61, if we accept a 10% 2SLS bias compared to 15% which is used for the rule of
thumb, and the value for K=4 would be lower than this. Using this rule we do not have weak
instruments, since the lowest rst stage F-value in our equation (6.2) is 7.12.
18We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the relevance of this mechanism.
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sonal trust and institutional quality, this time with only growth as the dependent
variable. In table 7, we use a variety of periods and sample sizes for interper-
sonal trust from WVS (2006). The interaction term remains negative and is
signicant in all specications except in (7.6), where we have omitted the upper
and lower decile observations leaving us with a quite small sample and less vari-
ation in interpersonal trust. That the coe¢ cient for the interaction term still
remains in the same region should be seen as a sign of strength of our model.
Di¤erent proxies for institutional quality are included in table 8 and the
result for the interaction term is robust to using risk of expropriation 1982-97
from the PRS, quality of public institutions in 1982 from ICRG, bureaucratic
delays 1972-1995 from BERI, and the number of procedures involved in, as well
as the number of days, and the cost of enforcing a contract from the World
Bank, as well as a linear combination of the three. We also test for measures of
corruption, the social infrastructure index and government antidiversion policies
from Hall and Jones (1999) and get the same results (not reported). Since the
various measures are available for samples of di¤erent sizes this can also be seen
as a mild test of the robustness of the results to di¤erent samples.
In table 9, we present some of the controls for other conditioning variables
that we have performed, and these include proxies for social distance (fraction-
alization from Alesina et al, 2003) and proximate causes of unrest (polarization
from Reynal-Querol, 2006), as well as proxies for historical factors such as state
antiquity from Putterman (2006), legal origin, and identity of past colonial
power. The main result remains intact and the magnitudes of the estimated
coe¢ cients are remarkably stable.
Finally, is it backwardness in the form of low income, rather than weak in-
stitutions, that gives a high return to social capital? Knack and Keefer (1997)
and Zak and Knack (2001) interact initial income and trust and get a signicant
and negative coe¢ cient when regressing growth 1980-1992, and both growth and
investment share 1970-1992 respectively. Whereas Knack and Keefer (1997) pro-
pose that this implies that trust is more needed where contracting institutions
are weak (without providing any evidence that this is the mechanism that makes
the interaction term negative), Zak and Knack (2001) argue that the result im-
plies that backwardness is more of an advantage in high-trust countries.
When we interact trust with income instead of with institutions we also
obtain a negative and signicant interaction term.19 In an attempt to nd out
19See Ahlerup et al (2007) for the details of this exercise.
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which mechanism is the stronger one, we included both the interaction of income
and trust and the interaction of institutions and trust. In our growth regression
the result is that neither of them enters signicantly, but when investment rate
is the dependent variable the interaction between trust and institutions continue
to be estimited with precision. One should not overinterpret the results from
this kind of exercise but a reasonable interpretation is that if anything it is the
level of formal institutions rather than the level of income that matters for the
e¤ect of trust on economic performance.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides new insights into the current debate about the roles of
social capital and institutions in economic development. Arguing that there is
a missing link from micro studies to macro studies of social capital, it presents
a simple theoretical framework and cross-country evidence showing that the
e¤ect of social capital on economic growth, as well as on the investment rate, is
nonlinear and dependent on the quality of formal institutions. More specically,
it shows that social capital matters the most when formal institutions are weak
and almost ceases to matter when institutions are strong.
For example, a one standard deviation increase in social capital is estimated
to increase the growth rate by 1.8 percentage points in Nigeria but only by 0.3
percentage points in Canada, which is in sharp contrast to earlier cross-country
studies that argue that social capital always improves economic growth. This
implies that present attempts at building social capital creates, if successful, a
strong pro-growth potential for poor countries with bad institutions. Concerns
have been raised that social capital is waning in the western world and that
this will have economic consequences. The ndings presented in this paper
imply that as long as the formal institutions are kept strong, these concerns
are premature. Though the Canada-Nigeria example should be regarded as
an illustration, the general results are highly robust to a number of di¤erent
specications in the basic variables.
The World Bank has made large e¤orts at promoting better formal insti-
tutions in developing countries and also, in recent years, begun focusing on
building social capital as well. E¤orts aimed at building social capital is con-
ducted in community-level projects. However, the extent to which these e¤orts
have been successful is rather unclear (World Bank, 2005). Our results indicate
16
that much could be gained by making these projects work in areas with poor
institutions.
Furthermore, much of the scholarly debate evolves around social capital and
formal institutions as either mainly substitutes or complements. The result of
this paper suggests that the relationship is mainly about substitution. However,
unlike some of the previous literature, the paper does not discuss or test for any
dynamic process between the variables. The deeper determinants, as well as the
evolution of the relationship over time, are still largely unresolved issues and
provide potential avenues for fruitful research, both theoretical and empirical.
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Table 1: Relevant studies on social capital and institutions. 
Author(s) Agents Social Capital 
measure(s) 
Institutional 
measure(s) 
Relevant Findings 
Beckman and Roger 
(2004) 
Hog farmers in two 
Poland 
Dependence on buyer; 
duration of business 
relationship; buyer 
specific investments 
Farmers’ preception of 
court strength 
Farmers are unwilling to take cases to court when the 
measures of social capital are high  
Beugelsdijk and 
Smulders (2004) 
Citizens of 54 European 
regions 
Density of associational 
activity; importance of 
family and friends. 
None Bridging social capital (associational activity) is positively 
related to economic growth whereas bonding social 
capital ( family ties, etc) is not.  
Bigsten et al. (2000) Manufacturing firms in 
6 African countries 
Length of business 
relationship. 
None Renegotiations of broken contracts are helped by (trust 
creating) long-term relations. Better institutions may 
encourage risk taking and therefore also lead to more 
recourse to courts in case of contract breach. 
Fafchamps and Minten 
(2002) 
Agricultural traders in 
Madagascar 
Number of relatives in 
agricultural trade;  
traders known; and 
potential informal 
lenders 
None Positive effect on firm productivity for better connected 
traders. Social capital lowers transaction costs.  
Grootaert and Narayan 
(2004) 
Households in 4 rural 
communities in Bolivia. 
Membership in local 
associations. 
“Effectiveness and 
universality of municipal 
government” 
Social capital matters more for the poor than the non-
poor. Social capital has a positive effect on welfare only 
in the more weakly institutionalized communities.  
Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2004) 
Households in Italy Electoral turnout, blood 
donation and trust (as 
measured by World 
Value Surveys). 
Mean number of years it 
takes to complete a 
first-degree trial. 
More social capital implies a more frequent use of 
checks, more investment in stocks a apposed to cash and 
more institutional rather than informal credit. The effect 
is stronger in areas with weaker legal enforcement.  
Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff (2002) 
Firms and customers  in 
5 East European 
countries  
Relational contracting Stated belief that courts 
can enforce contracts. 
Trust-based interaction (“relational contracting”) more 
likely when institutions are weak.  
Krishna (2001) Villages in rural India. An index created 
labour-group 
participation, 
assessments on the 
cooperative attitude, 
and trust, solidarity and 
Various variables 
measuring the agency 
power: how strong are 
the caste leaders; local 
government; patron-
client links; political 
Social capital is beneficial for development only if it is 
activated by agency power (i.e. needs some minimum 
level of institutions).  Social capital without agency power 
does not help development.  
 1 
 2 
reciprocity. parties’ power; village 
councils and the 
capacity of young and 
educated leaders.  
McMillan and Woodruff 
(1999) 
Managers of 
manufacturing firms in 
Vietnam 
Percent of relationships 
involving community 
sanctions and networks 
None Social capital is important since courts and private 
property rights are weak. Loss of future business 
opportunity is not an important sanction. Instead, 
scrutinization of potential clients, community sanctions, 
and renegotiation are commonly used.    
Miguel, Gertler and 
Levine (2005) 
Districts in Indonesia Relative expenditures on 
festivals and ceremonies 
and a subjective 
assessment on the 
traditional level of ethic 
and mutual cooperation. 
A number of measures 
of formal community 
groups. 
None Initial level of social capital does not predict subsequent 
industrial development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Variable descriptions 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Source: 
Main variables   
Growth Annual growth in GDP per capita1995-2005 World Bank (2006a) 
InitInc Log GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Laspeyres) Heston et al. (2006) 
InvPrice Price level of investment , PPP Heston et al. (2006) 
LifeExp Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Bank (2006a) 
Trust Interpersonal trust in survey 1990-95+96,97,81-89, imputed WVS (2006) 
Inst.  Quality of government, ICRG Teorell et al. (2006) 
   
Other variables   
bri_col British colony  CEPII (2006) 
Bureaucratic delays 1972-1995 Bureaucratic delays 1972-1995, BERI Teorell et al. (2006) 
Composite contract 
enforcement 
Composite court quality, calculated as the mean of the 
other three measures from World Bank (2006b) 
World Bank (2006b) 
Contract enforceability 1982-
89 
Contract enforceability, 1982-89, BERI La Porta et al. (1997) 
Cost of contract enforcement Cost to enforce contract (norm) in 2003 World Bank (2006b) 
Days for contract 
enforcement 
Time to enforce contract (norm) in 2003 World Bank (2006b) 
Abslat Absolute latitude in degrees CEPII (2006) 
Distcr Mean distance to coast or river Gallup et al. (2001) 
esp_col Spanish colony CEPII (2006) 
Ethnic Fractionalization Ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) 
Ethnic Polarization (mean) ETH12POL Reynal-Querol (2006) 
fra_col French colony CEPII (2006) 
InvRate  Gross capital formation in 2000(% of GDP) World Bank (2006a) 
legor_fr French legal origin  La Porta et al. (1997) 
legor_sc Scandinavian legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
legor_so Socialist legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
legor_uk British legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
Linguistic Fractionalization Linguistic fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) 
Procedures in contract 
enforcement 
Procedures to enforce contract(norm) in 2003 World Bank (2006b) 
prt_col Portugese colony CEPII (2006) 
Quality of public institutions, 
1982 
Quality of public institutions, 1982 Teorell et al. (2006) 
Religious Fractionalization Religious fract. Alesina et al. (2003) 
Religious Polarization Rel pol Reynal-Querol (2006) 
Risk of Expropriation 1982-
1997 
Risk of expropriation 1982-1997, ICRG Glaeser et al. (2004) 
State Antiquity State Antiquity by 1950, v3.  Putterman (2006) 
Trust (v.2) Interpersonal trust in survey 1990-95+96-99,81-89, 
imputed 
WVS (2006) 
Trust (v.3) Interpersonal trust in survey 1981-95 WVS (2006) 
Trust (v.4) Interpersonal trust in survey 1990-95 WVS (2006) 
Trust (v.5) Interpersonal trust in survey 1981-2004 WVS (2006) 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for main variables 
For countries and variables in specification (4.5): 
 Variable N Mean Std dev Min Max 
Growth 46 2.42  1.44 -0.36 7.87 
InitInc 46 9.23 0.85 6.85 10.29 
InvPrice 46 86.91 30.65 33.85 171.16 
LifeExp 46 72.05 6.86 45.18 79.54 
Trust 46 0.32 0.16 0.05 0.66 
Inst 46 0.76 0.21 0.36 1.00 
 
For countries and variables in specification (5.5): 
Variable N Mean Std dev Min Max 
InvRate 61 22.31 3.93 13.69 32.76 
InitInc 61 9.28 0.85 6.98 10.78 
InvPrice 61 67.06 23.47 17.63 137.50 
LifeExp 61 72.89 6.89 43.78 81.08 
Trust 61 0.30 0.14 0.05 0.66 
Inst 61 0.68 0.21 0.31 1.00 
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Table 4: Social capital, institutions, and growth 1995-2005 
 Dependent variable: Growth 1995-2005 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) 
InitInc -0.280 -0.695 -1.700 -1.504 -1.608 
 (0.34) (1.27) (2.97)*** (2.87)*** (3.31)*** 
InvPrice -0.016 -0.024 -0.028 -0.029 -0.023 
 (2.69)** (3.12)*** (3.68)*** (4.21)*** (3.44)*** 
LifeExp 0.036 0.024 0.050 0.039 0.052 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.93) (0.79) (1.13) 
Trust  6.668  4.028 15.896 
  (5.41)***  (3.14)*** (3.59)*** 
Inst   8.021 5.500 8.728 
   (5.94)*** (3.76)*** (4.90)*** 
Trust*Inst     -14.143 
     (2.78)*** 
Constant 3.857 7.053 10.827 10.567 7.594 
 (2.01)* (3.46)*** (4.89)*** (5.26)*** (3.54)*** 
N 46 46 46 46 46 
R2 0.15 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.70 
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In 
(4.1) robust standard errors are used. In all regressions InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 1995, while Trust is 
Interpersonal Trust(v.1) and Inst. is Quality of Government in 1995. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Social capital, institutions, and the investment rate in 2000. 
 Dependent variable: Investment rate 2000 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) 
InitInc 0.277 0.122 -0.640 -0.639 -1.952 
 (0.24) (0.10) (0.47) (0.46) (1.60) 
InvPrice -0.037 -0.038 -0.042 -0.042 -0.010 
 (1.21) (1.25) (1.38) (1.36) (0.36) 
LifeExp 0.163 0.164 0.144 0.144 0.144 
 (1.42) (1.42) (1.25) (1.23) (1.44) 
Trust  1.865  -0.142 55.616 
  (0.44)  (0.03) (4.33)*** 
Inst   5.414 5.475 30.728 
   (1.19) (1.10) (4.39)*** 
Trust*Inst     -73.752 
     (4.56)*** 
Constant 10.352 11.202 16.927 16.936 9.491 
 (1.57) (1.62) (1.97)* (1.96)* (1.25) 
N 61 61 61 61 61 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.35 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In all 
regressions InvRate, InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 2000, while Trust is Interpersonal Trust(v.2) and Inst. is 
Quality of Government in 2000. 
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Table 6: IV-estimations for Growth 1995-2005 and Investment Rate 2000. 
 
 Dependent variable: Growth 1995-2005 Dependent variable: Investment rate 2000
 OLS 2SLS LIML OLS 2SLS LIML 
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) 
InitInc -0.452 -1.224 -1.412 -1.952 -1.820 -1.941 
 (0.61) (0.82) (0.73) (1.60) (0.95) (0.95) 
InvPrice -0.036 -0.010 0.001 -0.010 0.014 0.018 
 (4.00)*** (0.40) (0.04) (0.36) (0.36) (0.44) 
LifeExp -0.014 0.009 0.023 0.144 0.148 0.149 
 (0.18) (0.08) (0.15) (1.44) (1.29) (1.26) 
Trust 20.656 81.121 102.852 55.616 79.729 86.135 
 (5.23)*** (2.39)** (2.09)** (4.33)*** (1.91)* (1.85)* 
Inst 7.466 28.040 35.223 30.728 41.577 44.549 
 (2.82)*** (1.87)* (1.68)* (4.39)*** (1.98)* (1.91)* 
Trust*Inst -20.445 -95.135 -122.915 -73.752 -112.338 -121.241 
 (4.02)*** (2.16)** (1.93)* (4.56)*** (2.06)** (1.98)* 
Constant 4.369 -7.798 -13.162 9.491 0.400 -0.755 
 (1.40) (0.69) (0.84) (1.25) (0.03) (0.05) 
N 61 60 60 61 60 60 
R2 0.46 a  a 0.35 a a
Notes:  a In 2SLS and LIML the R2 has no statistical meaning and is omitted from the table. Absolute value of t-statistic 
in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In (6.1) robust standard errors are used. 
In (6.1), (6.2), and (6.2) InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 1995. In (6.4), (6.5), and (6.6 ) InvRate, InitInc, 
InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 2000. Trust is Interpersonal Trust(v.2) and Inst. is Quality of Government in 2000. 
Instrumented variables are: Trust, Inst, and Trust*Inst. Instruments are: legor_uk legor_so abslat distcr.  In the case of 
2SLS the appropriate test for the validity of the instruments is the Sargan test statistic which his has the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are not correlated with the error term of the second stage and therefore that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the regression. Failure to reject the null implies that the instruments are valid. 
For LIML, a  corresponding test is the Anderson-Rubin test of overidentifying restrictions.Spec (6.2): First stage F-
values are 11.90 for Trust, 7.12 for Inst, and 12.05 for Trust*Inst. Sargan’s test of overidentification of all instruments: 
P-value=0.18472. Wu-Hauman test for exogenous regressors: P-value= 0.00346. Spec (6.3): First stage F-value: same 
as (6.2). Anderson-Rubin’s test of overidentification of all instruments, P-value= 0.23032. Spec (6.5): First stage F-
values are 9.10 for Trust, 6.91 for Inst, and 9.94 for Trust*Inst. Sargan’s test of overidentification of all instruments: P-
value=0.27626. Wu-Hauman test for exogenous regressors: P-value= 0.40179. Spec (6.6): First stage F-value: same as 
(6.5). Anderson-Rubin’s test of overidentification of all instruments, P-value= 0.27951. 
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Table 7: Controlling for alternative samples and measures of social capital  
 
 Dependent variable: Growth 1995-2005 
 Full Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Omit if 
Trust<p10 
Omit if 
Trust<p10 or 
Trust>p90 
 (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) 
InitInc -1.392 -1.465 -1.475 -1.318 -1.416 -1.207 
 (2.98)*** (3.05)*** (3.06)*** (2.72)*** (2.87)*** (2.00)* 
InvPrice -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 
 (3.24)*** (3.66)*** (3.61)*** (3.16)*** (3.42)*** (3.15)*** 
LifeExp 0.035 0.047 0.044 0.037 0.039 0.026 
 (0.81) (1.05) (0.97) (0.82) (0.83) (0.48) 
Inst 9.790 8.324 8.684 10.128 10.246 8.728 
 (5.51)*** (3.20)*** (3.46)*** (5.37)*** (4.45)*** (2.61)** 
Trust 17.438 16.868 17.083 17.755 22.573 17.771 
 (3.75)*** (2.59)** (2.68)** (3.33)*** (3.11)*** (1.79)* 
Trust*Inst -17.105 -15.094 -15.428 -17.948 -21.229 -16.203 
 (3.24)*** (2.04)* (2.16)** (2.95)*** (2.75)*** (1.46) 
Constant 6.244 6.966 7.047 5.351 5.244 5.604 
 (2.81)*** (2.60)** (2.66)** (2.16)** (1.95)* (1.80)* 
Trust 
(version) 
(v.2) (v.3) (v.4) (v.5) (v.1) (v.1) 
N 51 38 37 51 40 34 
R2 0.66 0.73 0.73 0.64 0.71 0.54 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In all 
regressions InitInc, InvPrice, and LifeExp are from 1995, Inst. is Quality of Government in 1995, while Trust is 
Interpersonal Trust (v.x). See variable description for exact coding. Trust>p10 means that countries with a trust value 
less than the 10th percentile is removed from the sample.  
       
 
 
Table 8: Controlling for alternative measures of institutional quality 
 
 Dependent variable: Growth 1995-2005 
 (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5) (8.6) (8.7) (8.8) 
InitInc -1.525 -1.057 -0.494 -1.048 -3.400 -2.818 -3.306 -3.446 
 (2.64)** (1.36) (0.59) (1.27) (3.83)*** (5.23)*** (3.48)*** (6.68)*** 
InvPrice -0.017 -0.015 -0.029 -0.016 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.003 
 (2.35)** (1.72)* (2.58)** (1.58) (0.18) (0.33) (0.01) (0.35) 
LifeExp 0.041 0.050 -0.005 0.028 0.212 0.206 0.241 0.220 
 (0.80) (0.80) (0.08) (0.35) (2.58)** (2.95)*** (2.41)** (3.58)*** 
Trust 21.225 17.783 23.124 16.947 5.751 5.895 5.032 5.150 
 (2.41)** (3.91)*** (4.00)*** (2.57)** (3.74)*** (2.22)** (3.01)*** (2.33)** 
Inst 0.983 0.417 1.060 1.896 1.821 1.969 2.049 3.762 
 (3.44)*** (1.79)* (2.74)** (1.66) (4.33)*** (2.03)** (4.63)*** (4.19)*** 
Trust*Inst -1.834 -1.469 -3.151 -4.455 -3.835 -5.901 -4.543 -8.141 
 (1.88)* (2.71)** (3.17)*** (1.83)* (3.02)*** (1.76)* (3.53)*** (2.80)*** 
Constant 5.202 4.857 2.725 5.104 17.162 12.403 14.758 17.383 
 (1.72)* (1.41) (1.08) (1.33) (3.89)*** (3.65)*** (3.47)*** (4.87)*** 
Trust (version) (v.1) (v.1) (v.1) (v.1) (v.5) (v.5) (v.5) (v.5) 
Institutional 
Measure 
Risk of 
Expropriation, 
1982 - 1997 
Quality of Public 
Institutions, 
1982 
Bureaucratic 
delays, 1972 - 
1995 
Contract 
Enforceability, 
1972 -1989 
Cost of contract 
enforcement 
Days for 
contract 
enforcement 
Procedures in 
contract 
enforcement 
Composite contract 
enforcement 
institutions 
N 46 39 38 28 62 60 60 60 
R2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.47 0.47 0.41 0.48 0.54 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 9: Conditioning variables 
 Dependent variable: Growth 1995-2005 
 (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) (9.7) (9.8) 
InitInc -1.367 -1.559 -1.502 -2.159 -2.228 -1.708 -1.527 -1.545 
 (2.89)*** (3.33)*** (2.94)*** (3.71)*** (4.00)*** (3.07)*** (2.84)*** (3.01)*** 
InvPrice -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.019 -0.019 -0.022 -0.024 -0.017 
 (3.74)*** (3.65)*** (3.49)*** (2.62)** (2.70)** (2.94)*** (3.21)*** (1.93)* 
LifeExp 0.011 0.018 0.036 0.098 0.116 0.059 0.045 0.055 
 (0.23) (0.39) (0.71) (1.91)* (2.26)** (1.16) (0.84) (0.94) 
Trust 14.495 15.015 16.511 13.684 13.208 16.574 15.378 14.258 
 (3.41)*** (3.51)*** (3.64)*** (3.04)*** (2.95)*** (3.39)*** (2.98)*** (2.81)*** 
Inst 7.951 8.790 9.085 9.117 9.620 9.124 8.153 7.366 
 (4.60)*** (5.13)*** (4.87)*** (4.76)*** (5.25)*** (4.42)*** (3.43)*** (3.26)*** 
Trust*Inst -12.732 -12.986 -14.820 -12.227 -11.923 -14.969 -13.375 -12.179 
 (2.61)** (2.64)** (2.85)*** (2.40)** (2.36)** (2.63)** (2.29)** (1.86)* 
Constant 9.468 9.820 7.699 8.968 7.710 7.775 7.898 7.097 
 (4.31)*** (4.21)*** (3.56)*** (4.05)*** (3.13)*** (3.46)*** (3.27)*** (2.55)** 
Control 
Variable(s) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization
Religious 
Fractionalization
Ethnic 
Polarization 
Religious 
Polarization State Antiquity 
Colonial 
dummies 
Legal Origin 
Dummies. 
-1.474 -1.183 -0.467 -0.340 0.596 -0.284 - - Coefficient of 
control (2.28)** (2.04)** (0.71) (0.61) (1.07) (0.42)   
N 46 46 46 41 41 45 46 46 
R2 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.70 0.72 
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The colonial and legal origin dummies can be 
found in Table 2.  
         
 
 
 
Figure 1: The investment game 
 
LENDER 
 1. CREDIT STAGE
 NOT LEND LEND
 
PRODUCER 
2. CONTRACT STAGE
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
0
0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+−−
PL
Lsdk
ππ
 
 
COURT 
FULFILLRENEGE
LENDER 
3. LAWSUIT STAGE
NOT 
ENFORCED 
1-β 
ENFORCED 
β 
4. COURT STAGE
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+
PP
LL
s
s
π
π
 TO COURT NOT TO COURT
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+−
PL
Lsk
ππ
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+
d
s
P
LL
π
π
 10
 
Figure 2: Investment game equilibria under varying strengths  
of court institutions and social capital. 
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Note: The figure is based on the results in Solutions, assuming the following parameter values: πL= πP=3, 
k=2, d=1, sL= sP=s. 
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